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A REQUEST TO THE HIGH COURT:
DON'T LET THE PATENT LAWS BE
DISTRACTED BY A FLASHY
TRADE DRESS
by MANorri L.
I.

JENKINSt

INTRODUCTION

On July 5, 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit decided a case that could have significant implications for intellectual property law well into the next century. In Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. DuracraftCorp.,' the Tenth Circuit framed the issue
as "whether a product configuration is entitled to trade dress protection
when it is or has been a significant inventive component of an invention
covered by a utility patent."2 The court, after labeling the matter as one
of first impression in its circuit, and involving the "intersection of the
Patent Act and the Lanham Trade-Mark Act," 3 answered that question4
in the negative, on grounds that "patent policy dictates" such a result.
The plaintiff, Vornado, appealed the decision to the United States
Supreme Court on September 29, 1995, and the Court denied certiorari
on January 8, 1996.
At first glance, one might conclude that the Supreme Court properly
declined to consider the Vornado appeal when compared to some of the
hot-button issues that the Court decided to review in its 1996-97 term.
t The author is an associate in the Indianapolis office of Barnes & Thornburg, Indiana's largest law firm. His primary practice area is intellectual property and trade regulation litigation. He extends appreciation to his wife, Karen Ann P. Lloyd, Esq., for her love
and support during his writing of this article. The author also thanks his friend and colleague, Lynn C. Tyler, Esq., without whose assistance completion of this project would have
been much more onerous.
1. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996). The Supreme
Court denied certiorari on Jan. 8, 1996. The author regrets the Court's decision, particularly in light of the tremendous potential for widespread conflict on this policy issue, and
the clear conflict in the federal circuits on this issue. However, the author is confident that
the Court will recognize the need to take up this issue in the near future.
2. Id. at 1499.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1500.
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These issues include the right to die, gun control, English-only laws, immunity of a sitting president to civil suit, and the availability of local
stations in cable television systems. 5 However, one should be mindful of
the pivotal attention that intellectual property rights demand in the
modem era. The next century is very likely to witness a plethora of intellectual property conflicts pertaining to both the Internet and increasingly sophisticated information-related technology. Furthermore, the
legal principles applicable to intellectual property rights go to the core of
our society's continuing need for technological advancement.
In this environment, the Supreme Court must resolve a conflict between two important federal statutes in intellectual property law: the
Patent Act and the Lanham Act. As is shown below, the need for Court
resolution of this conflict is even more glaring in light of the disagreement among the federal circuits on how best to solve the problem. Moreover, litigants in patent and trademark disputes appear to be raising this
issue in greater frequency. Several cases similar to Vornado have surfaced since the Tenth Circuit rendered that decision less than eighteen
months ago. Hence, despite the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari for
the 1996-97 term, the Court will likely hear a Vornado-related issue in
the near future.
This article seeks to predict how the Supreme Court would rule on a
Vornado-related issue. Enroute to that prediction, this article peruses
the history of Supreme Court decisions involving similar issues in the
contexts of patent, trademark, and unfair competition disputes. This article also discusses cases from three federal circuits relating to these issues. Prior to discussing the Supreme Court's and the federal circuits'
decisions, however, this article briefly discusses the history and policies
of the Patent Act and the Lanham Act. After careful consideration of
Supreme Court precedents which discuss the principles involved, the relevant lower court decisions, and the competing policies inherent in patent and trademark law, this article concludes that the Court would likely
agree with both the result and reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Vornado. Such a ruling might be interpreted as the Court drawing a line in
the sand regarding Lanham Act prohibition of industrial copying, particularly in light of two recent decisions by the Court on trade dress and
6
trademark disputes.

5. Supreme Court Cases to Watch: These areSome Heavyweights for the Court's199697 Term, IND. STAR, Oct. 6, 1996, at A14.

6. The cases referred to here are Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763
(1992), and Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995). Arguably,
the Court appeared to be announcing a willingness to give broader protection to Lanham
Act plaintiffs than it had previously.
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PATENT ACT v. LANHAM TRADEMARK ACT
II. BACKGROUND

A. THE FEDERAL STATUTES AT IssuE
The Tenth Circuit defined the conflict in Vornado as one that primarily pitted the Patent Act against the Lanham Act, two important federal statutes in intellectual property law. This section discusses the
respective policies and principles that accompany both statutes.
1.

The PatentAct

a.

Early statutes and constitutional foundation

Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution empowers Congress to create a patent act by stating: "The Congress shall
have power . . . to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries." 7 As a result of this empowerment, Congress enacted the first patent statute in 1790. 8 This first statute provided that patents would be granted for "any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein
not before known or used." 9 Three years later, Congress replaced the
1790 Act with a new statute which authorized a patent for "any useful
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement [thereon], not known or used before the application
"10

In 1836, Congress enacted another patent statute which replaced
the 1793 Act. 1 ' This time, Congress made substantial revisions, which
included the creation of a Patent Office, as well as a new system for examining patent applications to ensure that they complied with the requirement of "novelty over the prior art."1 2 Then again, in 1870,
Congress replaced the 1836 statute, but the Act remained substantially
3
the same, with some minor variations.'
b.

The 1952 Patent Act
In 1952, Congress enacted the current Patent Act. 14 The 1952 Act
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8.

DONALD CHISUM & MICHAEL JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

LAW § 2B(1), at 2-9 (1995) (citing Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109).

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. § 2B(2) at 2-11.
12. Id. The term "prior art" as used in patent law parlance pertains to what was already known, or already in the "public domain" from prior patents, inventions, or other
sources. CHIsuM & JACOBS, supra note 8, § 2C(5), at 2-83.
13. CmIsuM & JACOBS, supra note 8, § 2B(3).
14. CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 8, § 2B(5).
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largely rearranged prior statutory provisions and codified several court
decisions. 15 The most significant change brought about by the Act is
probably the addition of a provision that specifically requires an invention to be "nonobvious" in order to receive a patent.1 6 Due to the addition of this provision, the 1952 Act established a three-prong standard
for patentability that is now well-known among patent law practitioners
and scholars: 1) novelty, 1 7 2) utility,' 8 and 3) nonobviousness. 19
c.

Patents and public policy

A patent law scholar explained the policy rationale for the patent
system more than 100 years ago:
The granting of a patent privilege at once accomplishes three important
objectives; it rewards the inventor for his skill and labor in conceiving
and perfecting his invention; it stimulates him, as well as others, to still
further efforts in the same or different fields; it secures to the public an
immediate knowledge of the character and scope of the invention, and
an unrestricted right to use it after the patent has expired. Each of
these objects, with its consequences, is a public good, and tends directly
to the advancement of the industrial arts. Any system of law which
is
attains these results, without the undue restriction of natural rights, 20
evidently consonant with reasoning, justice, and sound public policy.
Patent policy, therefore, is based largely on a contract quid pro quo
analysis: the federal government grants to an inventor a monopoly on
her invention for a limited time, in exchange for society's technological
advancement. This advancement comes through the public's immediate
exposure to the character and scope of the invention, as well as an unfettered right to use the invention upon the patent's expiration. In more
recent times, another patent law scholar articulated this same basic
principle in another way:
15. CHIsUM & JACOBS, supra note 8, § 2B(5).
16. CMsUM & JACOBS, supra note 8, § 2B(5) (stating that § 103 of the 1952 Act was the
first instance where Congress had included a statutory provision on nonobviousness).
17. Section 101 of the Patent Act is the statutory basis for both the novelty and utility
requirements: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent. . . ." 35 U.S.C. §101 (1996).
18. This requirement specifically relates to utility patents, but not to design patents.
19. Section 103 delineates the nonobviousness standard:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains ....
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1996).
20. WiLLiAM C. ROBINSON, ROBINSON ON PATENTS § 33 (1890).
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The United States has staked its national destiny and welfare upon the
basic principle that private initiative, creative talents and venture capital shall be the primary means of determining the recipients of rewards
for competitive enterprise. The American Patent System is deeply imbedded in that tradition. The Constitutional provision and the laws relating to patent rights give the patentee a limited-time exclusiveness.
This temporary protection against free competition is awarded in the
faith that it will serve the public interest ....

The exclusiveness of pat-

ent rights is regarded as a short-term public welfare monopoly which
promotes the competitive economy of which the Patent System is itself a
21
vital part.
These passages convey that the raison d'etre of the American patent
system is society's eventual unrestricted access to the creative fruits of
inventors-fruits which the federal government permits inventors to exploit exclusively for a limited duration.
2.

The Lanham Act

a.

Historicalfoundation

Two intellectual practitioners and commentators succinctly articulated the historical foundation of the Lanham Act:
Competition is the foundation of the United States economic system.
The competitive market structure's ideal is consumer benefit through
lower prices and higher quality, more varied goods and services. In general, the more competitors in a given product or service market the better. The purpose of many legal doctrines and rules is to preserve and
enhance competition, but the purpose of other doctrines and rules is to
prevent unchecked competitive behavior from destroying the basic conditions necessary for competition itself or violating other public interests. Among these limiting doctrines and rules is the concept of unfair
competition ....

the umbrella term for the doctrines and rules that

prohibit competition by deceptive, improper methods and provide remedies to one competitor who is or may be injured by another's
2
activities.

2

Hence, the concept of unfair competition is the state common law
precursor to the Lanham Act, enacted by Congress in 1946 after several
failed attempts to federalize unfair competition law. 23 The primary con21. S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, A New Approach to Evaluationof the American Patent
System, 33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 555 (1951) (emphasis added).
22. CmSUM & JACOBS, supra note 8, § 5B, at 5-8.
23. See CmIsuM & JACOBS, supra note 8, § 5B, at 5-8 (discussing congressional attempts to respond to the major national expansion of the United States economy by enacting a uniform trademark statute as one facet of unfair competition law). However,
congressional intent was limited by the Constitution which, despite providing for congressional action to establish patent and copyright laws, included no such right of action in the
area of unfair competition; eventually, Congress relied on the Commerce Clause as the
constitutional foundation for establishing such a provision:
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cern of the Lanham Act is trademarks, which have two primary functions: 1) to permit manufacturers of goods to benefit from their
investments in making high-quality products; and 2) to serve as a "shortcut for the consumer who can rely on the mark as a substitute for testing
of each particular product he buys in normal trade channels." 24 Since
1976, the federal courts have interpreted the Lanham Act as providing a
federal unfair competition remedy that protects a manufacturer's trade
25
dress through § 43(a).
26

b. Section 43(a)

Courts originally restricted trade dress coverage under § 43(a) to unlawful copying of a product's packaging. 2 7 But over time several federal
court decisions extended § 43(a) trade dress coverage to include the product's configuration, ornamentation, and overall image or motif.28 HowIn all subsequent trademark legislation, Congress linked federal trademark regis-

tration to use of the mark in interstate commerce. In the mid-1900's, in civil
rights and other cases not involving trademarks, the Supreme Court substantially
expanded Congress's constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. As a
result, the commerce limitation on Congress' power to provide trademark protection diminished.
CmsinM & JAcOBs, supra note 8, § 5B, at 5-8 (citations omitted).
24. WmEL.Am FRANcIs & ROBERT COLLINS, CASES AND MATERIAL ON PATENT LAw pt. 4, at
936 (1995).

25. See Truck Equip. Servs. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). In Truck Equip. Servs., the court held that when the defendant copied the exterior design of the plaintiffs semi-trailer, he engaged in unfair competition. Id. The court granted relief to the plaintiff through § 43(a). Id. at 1216.
26. Section 43(a) states:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false
description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to
describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such
designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to
be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be
transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in
the locality falsely indicated as that origin or in the region in which said locality is
situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the
use of any such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
27. See CinsuM & JACOBS, supra note 8, § 5C[2][c], at 5-31.
28. See, e.g., Coach Leatherware Co., Inc. v. Ann Taylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 168 (2nd
Cir. 1991) (section 43(a) protects a product's trade dress, which is the total image of a good,
including size, shape, color, texture and graphics); Rachel v. Banana Republic Inc., 831
F.2d 1503, 1506 (9th Cir. 1987) (trade dress is the overall appearance of the product); John
H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that
trade dress involves the overall image of a product and may include not only size, shape,
color, and texture, but also particular sales techniques).
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ever, functional trade dress cannot receive protection under § 43(a). 29
c.

Trademarks, trade dress, and public policy

Trademark and trade dress protection under the Lanham Act serve
the public by preventing consumer confusion as to the source of goods, as
well as protecting the goodwill of producers who have made investments
in ensuring that their goods are of high quality. While trade dress only
began receiving Lanham Act protection approximately twenty years
ago,30 trade dress concerns the same public policy matters that traditional trademark law does. According to one commentator:
The growing interest in protecting product configurations, and the expansion of traditional trademark principles to accommodate this interest, stems from a recognition by both businesses and the courts that a
product's appearance can be a repository of goodwill, and can serve as
an indicator of source or origin, to the same extent as a word or logo.
Hand-in-hand with this recognition is the realization that copying or
imitation of product configuration by competitors can result in the same
sort of consumer confusion and accompanying loss of sales and injury to
infringement of more traditional trademarks,
goodwill as results from
31
such as word marks.
III.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS IN VORNADO

In Vornado,32 the issue concerned the configuration of a household
fan. The plaintiff, Vornado, commenced selling its spiral grilled fans in
November 1988, and a few months later, applied for a utility patent on a
"ducted fan with a spiral grill."3 3 Vornado received a patent in May
1990, then expanded its claims and received a reissue patent in February, 1994. 34 Vornado's patent applications claimed a multi-featured fan,
including the spiral grill, which had as its "inventive aspect.., that the
point of maximum lateral spacing between the curved vanes was moved
inboard from the grill's outer radius, so that it was at the impeller
blade's point of maximum power." 3 5 Vornado sold about 135,000 of these
29. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981). "One of
the essential elements of the law of trademarks, even at common law where it was a part of
the law of unfair competition, was the principle that no legal protection would be available
for products or features that were functional." Id. at 824.
30. See Truck Equip. Servs., 536 F.2d at 1215.
31. Lawrence R. Hefter, Protectionof Product Configurations in the United States, 295
PLI/Pat 113, 117 (1990).
32. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996).

33. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500.
34. Id.
35. Id. The court noted that plaintiff did not attempt to have the spiral grill patented
by itself because the idea was already in the public domain. Id.
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fans between January 1989 and August 1990.36
37
The defendant, Duracraft, entered this market in August 1990.

Duracraft marketed a household fan that featured a spiral vane structure copied from the plaintiffs product. Duracraft's fan was much less
38
expensive than Vornado's, and did not infringe on the plaintiffs patent.
Duracraft sold nearly one million of these fans between August 1990 and
9
November 1992.3

Alleging that the grill design on Duracraft's fan infringed Vornado's
trade dress, the plaintiff filed suit.40 The district court held for the plain-

tiff, finding that Vornado's grill design had met all the requirements for
trade dress protection under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 4 1 The Tenth
Circuit did not rule on the propriety of this finding, but instead reversed
the decision on more policy-driven grounds-that to grant Vornado trade
dress protection under these circumstances would stifle federal patent
policy.42

A. A CLASH

BETWEEN

Two

FEDERAL STATUTES

Again, the Tenth Circuit squarely recognized this case as presenting
a clash between two federal statutes-the Patent Act and the Lanham
Act. 43 The court stated:

Except to the extent that Congress has clearly indicated which of two
statutes it wishes to prevail in the event of a conflict, we must interpret
and apply them in a way that preserves the purposes of both and fosters
harmony between them .... Where, as here, both cannot apply, we look
44
to their fundamental purposes to choose which one must give way.
The court explained that the policies and purposes of the Patent Act
are: 1) fostering and rewarding invention; 2) promoting disclosure of inventions, thus stimulating more inventions, as well as permitting the
public to practice the invention once the patent expires; and 3) imposing
stringent requirements for patentability, thus assuring that ideas already in the public domain remain there.4 5 The court concluded that
"the centerpiece of federal patent policy is its ultimate goal of public dis36. Id.

37. Id.
38. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500-01.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1501-02. Courts have interpreted § 43(a) of the Lanham Act as providing
trade dress protection for products which are "nonfunctional," and either "inherently distinctive" or have acquired "secondary meaning." Id.
42. Id. at 1502.
43. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1507.
44. Id. (citations omitted).
45. Id.
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closure and use."46 In contrast, the court stated that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act is fundamentally concerned with: 1) ensuring that consumers
are not confused, misled, or deceived as to whose product they are buying; 2) protecting sellers' investment in their reputation for carrying
quality products; and 3) enhancing competition among various producers
and sellers of goods and services. 47 The court added:
The degree to which a producer's goodwill will be harmed by the copying
of product configurations correlates with the degree of consumer confusion as to source or sponsorship that is likely to result from copying. We
do not doubt that at least some consumers are likely to ignore product
labels, names, and packaging and look only to the design of product features to tell one brand from another. These consumers are likely to be
confused by similar product designs, and to the degree that this confusion is tolerated, the goals of the Lanham Act will be undermined.
But the Lanham Act, like common-law unfair competition law and most
state unfair competition statutes, has never provided absolute protection against all consumer confusion as to source or sponsorship. For its
first fifteen to twenty years, the Act was not even applied to the shapes of
48
products or their containers.

The court concluded that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act gave "at best...
a peripheral concern" to protecting consumers against any confusion that
may arise from the copying of "configurations that are significant parts of
patented inventions . . .49

B.

THE FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE DOES NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM

The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that courts often assume that the
functionality doctrine5 0 would necessarily preclude any conflicts between
the Patent Act and the Lanham Act-"at least as to utility patents."5 '
The court expressly disagreed with this assumption.
Finding that. functionality in "trade dress parlance" is defined in
terms of "competitive need,"5 2 the court opined that a product configuration could be simultaneously useful, novel, and nonobvious 53-hence capable of receiving a utility patent-and nonfunctional-thus a candidate
for trade dress protection.5 4 The court reasoned that "this is the case
46. Id. (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 1508 (citations omitted).
48. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1509 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. Id. "If competitors need to be able to use a particular configuration in order to
make an equally competitive product, it is functional, but if they do not, it may be nonfunctional." Id. at 1507.
51. Id. at 1506.
52. Id. at 1507.
53. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
54. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1506.
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because to meet patent law's usefulness requirement, a product need not
be better than other alternatives or essential to competition."5 5 On the
other hand, the court commented that "[tihe availability of equally satisfactory alternatives for a particular feature, and not its inherent usefulness, is often the fulcrum on which Lanham Act functionality analysis
turns." 5 6

C. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S CONCLUSION
We hold that where a disputed product configuration is part of a claim
in a utility patent, and the configuration is a described, significant inventive aspect of the invention.., so that without it the invention could
not fairly be said to be the same invention, patent law prevents its5 7protection as trade dress, even if the configuration is nonfunctional.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Vornado decision appears to present the first occasion for any
federal court (including the Supreme Court) to address squarely the issue of whether the objectives of the Patent Act or the Lanham Act should
prevail where there is a conflict concerning patent and trade dress law.
As revealed by the following discussion, federal courts typically have circumvented direct conflict by holding that the functionality doctrine necessarily resolve the problem. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and the
federal circuits have had occasion to analyze cases within the purview of
this problem.
The first section of this analysis discusses relevant cases from the
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits pertaining to the cross between patent and trademark policies and principles. The second section of this
analysis discusses Supreme Court precedents which analyze patent,
trademark, and unfair competition disputes. The Court's rulings in
these cases appear strongly consistent with the Tenth Circuit's holding
in Vornado. Furthermore, this section includes the two most recent
Supreme Court cases related to this subject, which appear at first glance
to be somewhat inconsistent with the line of cases dating back prior to
55. Id. at 1506 (citing Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
56. Id. at 1507.
57. Id. at 1510. The Tenth Circuit included language in this opinion that will likely
provide the battleground for future litigation pertaining to this issue:
In future cases, the contribution of a particular configuration to the inventiveness
of a patented product may not always be clear, and we do not wish to rule out the
possibility that a court may appropriately conduct a factual inquiry to supplement
its reading of the patent's claims and descriptions.
Id. In other words, patent prosecutors might circumvent the "wrath of Vornado" for their
clients that may want to retain the ability to get trade dress protection for a particular
product configuration, by not claiming that configuration as part of the invention, nor
describing that configuration as significant. This, however, may be easier said than done.
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the turn of the century. On the contrary, this article contends that no
such inconsistency exists. Finally, the last section of this analysis argues that the Supreme Court likely would agree with the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning and result in Vornado when the Court eventually decides to
hear a case on this issue.
A.

IMPORTANT RELATED CiRcurr OPINIONS

1.

Second Circuit

a.

Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co.5 8

In a landmark decision credited with establishing the standard for
secondary meaning in trademark law, District Judge Learned Hand
drew the battle line between the right of a supplier to retain customers
through appropriate identification of its product, and the right of other
suppliers to compete effectively for those customers. In Crescent Tool,
Judge Hand explained the conflict as follows:
[N]either side has an absolute right, because their mutual rights conflict. Thus the plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through
false representations that those are his wares which in fact are not, but
he may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling. The defendant, on the other hand, may copy the plaintiffs goods slavishly
down to the minutest detail; but he may not represent himself as the
plaintiff in their sale. When the appearance of the goods has in fact
come to represent a given person as their source, and that person is in
fact the plaintiff, it is impossible to make these rights absolute; compromise is essential .... We can only say that the court must require such
changes in appearance as will effectively distinguish the defendant's
no event may the plaintiff supwares with the least expense to him; in
59
press the defendant's sales altogether.
This case involved a plaintiff corporation's attempt to have the
courts preliminarily enjoin a defendant corporation from selling a certain
adjustable wrench which had an appealing appearance because of its
new and original shape.6 0 The plaintiff started marketing the wrench,
known as the "Crescent" wrench, in 1908.61 Two years later, the defendant corporation began manufacturing and selling an adjustable wrench
which was almost a direct facsimile of the plaintiffs wrench.6 2 Although
there was no evidence that the defendant had attempted to imitate the
packaging of the "Crescent" wrench or use the word "Crescent" in its advertisements, the court found that some customers believed that the de58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

247 F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
Id. at 299.
Id.
Id.
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fendant's wrenches were the plaintiffs wrenches. 63 The court further
found the distinctive features of the "Crescent" wrench to be
64
nonfunctional.
Despite these findings, the Second Circuit nevertheless refused to
grant the injunction, holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove secondary meaning. 65 Judge Hand wrote:
The defendant has as much right to copy the 'nonfunctional' features of
the article as any others, so long as they have not become associated
with the plaintiff as manufacturer or source. The critical question of
fact at the outset always is whether the public is moved in any degree to
buy the article because of its source and what are the features by which
it distinguishes that source. Unless the plaintiff can answer this question he can take no step 6forward;
no degree of imitation of details is
6
actionable in its absence.
Thus, in this early case involving the conflict between the right to
copy and the right to prevent others from encroaching on a distinctive
product look, the Second Circuit seems to have prioritized the right to
copy. Despite the fact that this case did not concern patent issues directly, the court's conclusion is consistent with that of the Tenth Circuit
in Vornado. This consistency arises because Vornado necessarily recognizes a right to copy by ruling that the product configuration at issue was
not eligible for trade dress protection.
b.

67
IndustriaArredamenti v. Charles Craig,Ltd.

In Industria Arredamenti, the Second Circuit defined the issue as
"whether [the plaintiff] is entitled to the exclusive use of its design after
expiration of the period of patent protection."68 In contrast to the central
issue in this article, however, this case involved a product design which
had previously enjoyed design patent protection.
The plaintiff was an Italian sofa manufacturer who in 1971, began
marketing uniquely designed sofas in the United States. 69 The plaintiff
constructed the sofa's back pillows so that the top of each pillow overhung the top of adjacent modules and was attached to a molded bolster
or tongue, which in turn fit into a U-shaped slot between adjacent mod63. Crescent Tool, 247 F. at 299.

64. Id. at 300.
65. Id. at 301. Generally, the term "secondary meaning" is used to indicate that a
trademark or trade dress "has become through use to be uniquely associated with a particular source." RESTATEMENT (THmD) oF UNFAIR CoMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (Tent. Draft No. 2,
Mar. 23, 1990).
66. Crescent Tool, 247 F. at 301.
67. 725 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 19.
69. Id. at 18.
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ules. 70 The tongue would hold the cushions in place if placed in the
slot. 7 1 The court described the sofa as "aesthetically pleasing, with a soft

appearance unusual for a sofa with back pillows firmly affixed to the
frame." 72 In 1981, the defendant, an American manufacturer, began
marketing sofas which the court found were "virtually identical" to the
plaintiffs. 73 The plaintiff claimed that the design of its sofa was an unregistered trademark and sought to enjoin from further marketing the
74
defendant's sofa.
The district court granted the injunction but the Second Circuit reversed on grounds that the sofa design was functional. 75 The court held
that the design of a product need not be utilitarian in order to be functional; if the design enhances the "saleability" of the product, then the
design is functional. 76 Because the court found the design to be functional, it did not have to consider the issue of Lanham Act protection for
a formerly patented design. But the court gave important dictum:
Our patent laws provide limited protection for new and useful inventions, but, beyond the protection of the patent laws, the general policy of
our law is to favor competition. Early comers may not exclude

latecomers. One may not welcome new competition, but one may not
legally complain of it. There is a minute exception, of course, for one
may not appropriate another's trademark. That exception, however,

tends to enhance competition and keep it fair. The newcomer may produce and sell
identical goods, so long as he does not use another's figur77
ative label.

One way of interpreting the Second Circuit's language here is that
the court construes the patent laws 78 to be the only indisputable source
of monopoly protection for new inventions, whereas trademark protection requires scrutiny as to whether trademark protection furthers the
goal of fair competition. The logical conclusion from this interpretation
is that the Second Circuit would recognize the supremacy of patent goals
over trademark goals if the court had to rule on a matter with a conflict
concerning monopoly protection. A contrasting interpretation might be
that this language is relatively innocuous and reveals nothing more than
70. Id. at 19.
71. Id.
72. IndustriaArredamenti, 725 F.2d at 19.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 18.
75. Id. at 20.
76. Id.
77. IndustriaArredamenti, 725 F.2d at 20 (emphasis added).
78. In some instances, like here, where this article refers to the "patent laws," the reference includes copyright law as well. In other instances where copyright does not apply,
the reference is solely to the patent laws.
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what is generally already known: the patent laws protect new inventions from competition while the trademark laws keep competition fair.
c.

79
Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Inc.

In Milstein, the Second Circuit refused to grant trade dress protection for a product configuration which the court labeled merely an "idea
or concept."8 0 The court also appears to have intimated that product
configurations cannot receive trade dress protection if such protection
conflicts with patent law.
The plaintiff in this case was a greeting card manufacturer which
sought to restrain a defendant competitor from marketing a card shaped
like animals and other figures. 8 ' In 1982, the plaintiff began to market a
line of greeting cards which it claimed had a unique look that the plaintiff should have exclusive rights to use. The court described the cards:
Its [plaintiffs] greeting cards are typically a sheet of paper, folded vertically, that has been cut to the outline of an animal, person, or object
depicted in a color photograph on the front panel of the card. With this
die-cutting technique, the photograph completely fills the front panel.
The inside panels and the back panel of the card
are usually blank. The
82
cards are packaged in clear cellophane bags.
The defendant company began marketing a substantially similar
product in 1994.83 However, the defendant's product differed from the
plaintiffs in that it was "tri-cut" and depicted the die-cut photographic
image on the face of all three panels of the card.8 4 But like the plaintiffs
cards, the defendant's cards also had blank interiors and were packaged
in clear cellophane bags.8 5
In bringing the action under § 43(a), the plaintiff alleged "infringe86
ment of the general format of its entire line of die-cut greeting cards."
The plaintiff claimed that its line of greeting cards was unique because
its competitors' cards had an "antique" look, were not "glossy," were not
completely "die-cut," or were made from "drawings rather than from photographs."8 7 The court rejected these distinctions as insufficient to warrant trade dress protection for the plaintiffs product because "[plaintiff]
is effectively seeking protection for an idea or concept-die-cut photo79. 58 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995).

80. Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Milstein, 58 F.3d at 30.
Id.
Id.

87. Id. at 33.
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graphic greeting cards."8 8
More relevant to the central issue in this paper, however, was the
court's dictum concerning the relationship between trade dress and patent protection. The court stated:
[Alithough trade dress law may supplement ...patent law by protecting unpatentable product configurations . . .overextension of trade
dress protection can undermine restrictions in... patent law that are
designed to avoid monopolization of products and ideas. Consequently,
courts should proceed with caution in assessing claims to unregistered
trade dress9protection so as not to undermine the objectives of [the pat8
ent] laws.
The court strongly suggests that it would refuse to grant trade dress
protection to product configurations where such protection would conflict
with patent law goals. However, in the next case, a district court from
the Second Circuit refused to go that far in interpreting this language
from Milstein.
d.

Hubbell, Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc.90

In Hubbell, the Southern District of New York had occasion to speak
more directly to the issue at hand. Concerned with whether a product
configuration which formerly received design patent coverage could subsequently receive trade dress protection, the court responded: "The different purposes of the two sets of laws supports the position that trade
dress protection is not as a matter of law unavailable to products for
which design patents have expired."9 1
In this case, a plaintiff manufacturer of an electrical plug and connector sued a manufacturer and a distributor of a product which the
plaintiff alleged, infringed the plaintiffs trade dress. 92 The product,
which the plaintiff called one of its "famous and highly distinctive 'Valise'
Trade Dress" electrical products, was the subject of an expired design
patent. 9 3 The defendants answered by claiming that the plaintiff was
88. Id. By labeling plaintiff's design a generalized "idea or concept," the court in effect
found the design to be "generic." Id. Trademark law absolutely precludes protection of
designs that are generic. The Supreme Court and all of the federal circuits have adopted
the 1976 approach established by Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit, which delineated
five classes of trademarks: 1) generic, 2) descriptive, 3) suggestive, 4) arbitrary, and 5)
fanciful. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2nd Cir. 1976)
(stating that generic trademarks never receive protection, while descriptive trademarks
may if they have acquired secondary meaning; suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful trademarks always receive protection).
89. Milstein, 58 F.3d at 32 (emphasis added).
90. 883 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
91. Id. at 959.
92. Id. at 958.
93. Id. at 957-58.
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unlawfully seeking to extend its monopoly through the device of the Lan94
ham Act.
The court agreed with the plaintiff that the defendants' product infringed the plaintiffs trade dress.9 5 The court furthermore rejected the
defendants' argument that the plaintiff was attempting to extend a monopoly on the product. 96 The court stated:
These two bodies of law [patent and trademark] were designed to serve
quite different purposes and may operate separately and without unavoidable conflict ....

[Tihe expiration of the design patent does not

preclude a party from seeking to protect its reputation or avoid consumer confusion over products if it can demonstrate the required elements of a Lanham Act, or other non-conflicting unfair competition
claim .... [T]he fact that the federal patent and trademark laws have
co-existed for decades, provides support for the proposition that the pro97
tections offered by them can exist together now.
Less than three months after the decision in this case, the defendants filed a motion to have the district court certify a question to the
Second Circuit. The question was: "whether the subject matter of an expired design and utility patent may form the basis for a later product
configuration trade dress action."98 In refusing to grant the defendants'
motion, whereupon they claimed that the Second Circuit's language in
Milstein 99 supported their argument, the court stated that:
The most that can be inferred from the language quoted [from Milstein]
is that the Second Circuit has recognized that the patent and trade
dress laws serve different objectives. This observation, however, is
neither novel nor controversial. As this Court observed in the Opinion,
the patent laws seek to foster and reward innovation, promote disclosure of inventions to the public after the patent has expired, and ensure
that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public. The trademark laws, in contrast, seek to protect the public from
experiencing confusion, mistake and deception in the purchase of goods
and services and to protect the integrity of the trademark owner's product identity. The part of the quoted language that admonishes district
courts to 'proceed with caution in addressing claims to unregistered
trade dress protection' can be interpreted only as advocating a careful
case by case approach in order to ensure that the objectives of the patent law are not undermined by extending protection to a product's trade
dress.100
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 959.
Hubbell, 883 F. Supp. at 955.
Id.
Id. at 959, 961.
Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Inc., 1995 WL 464906 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1995).
Hubbell, Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
1995 WL 464906 at *3 (citations omitted).
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As of this writing, the Second Circuit had not yet directly addressed
the issue at hand. But the preceding cases appear to suggest that this
court would appreciate the Tenth Circuit's view in Vornado. However,
the case-by-case approach articulated by the Southern District of New
York in Hubbell cannot be taken lightly, as that approach appears to be
the competing view to Vornado's bright-line rule. A very recent case decided by a district court in the Seventh Circuit appears to substantiate
that observation, as the following section reveals.
2.

Seventh Circuit

a. W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene' 01
In W.T. Rogers, the Seventh Circuit, in dictum, stated that a determination that a design is functional is a per se barricade to a clash between the patent and trademark laws on product configurations.1 0 2 The
court stopped short of holding as such in this case, however, because the
03
plaintiff never sought patent protection for the product in question.
W.T. Rogers involved competing manufacturers of office supplies. 104
In particular, the dispute centered around a molded plastic stacking office tray for letters and other documents. 10 5 In 1969, the plaintiff began
manufacturing the tray, which had hexagonal sides, small holes on the
top, and "feet" on the bottom, which allowed trays to be clamped together
with other trays to form a stack.10 6 The tray, which was a big success
among consumers, differed from other trays on the market which had
rectangular ends. 10 7 In 1983, the defendant company began to manufacture and market a product which was a facsimile of the plaintiff's
product.108

The Seventh Circuit reversed the jury's verdict, holding that the district court gave an erroneous instruction on functionality.' 0 9 The court
remanded the case and provided an instruction on functionality. 110 The
court instructed:
[T]he jury has to determine whether the feature for which trademark
protection is sought is something that other producers of the product in
question would have to have as part of the product in order to be able to
compete effectively in the market-in other words, in order to give con101. 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
102. Id.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 337.
Id.
Id.
W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 337.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 346.
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sumers the benefits of a competitive market-or whether it is the kind
of merely incidental feature which gives the brand some individual distinction but which producers of competing brands can readily do without. A feature can be functional not only because it helps the product
achieve the objective for which the product would be valued by a person
indifferent to matters of taste, charm, elegance, and beauty, but also
the product more pleasing to people not indifferent to
because it makes
11
such things. 1
Most relevant to the central issue in this paper, however, was the
court's dictum: "[Pirovided that a defense of functionality is recognized,
there is no conflict [between § 43(a)] and federal patent law."' 12 That
language becomes relevant due to the natural conclusion from this view,
that the bright-line rule expressed in Vornado is unnecessary since a
functionality determination solves the problem. Moreover, this court
probably would have decided a case with Vornado facts differently than
the Tenth Circuit did, since the product configuration in Vornado was
found to be nonfunctional.
b. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc. 113
In Kohler,the Seventh Circuit defined the issue as whether "the § 45
definition of 'Trademark' in the Lanham Act... exclude[s] trademark
protection of product configurations."' 14 In short, the court relied on legislative history to hold that "Congress intended that product configurations [be] eligible for trademark status under § 45 of the Lanham
Act." 1 15 The court added that Lanham Act protection in general for
product configurations does not conflict with the patent laws, reasoning,
inter alia, that "a product's different qualities can be protected simultaneously, or successively, by more than one of the statutory means for
116
protection of intellectual property."
In this case, a manufacturer of faucets challenged the Patent and
Trademark Office's (PTO) granting of trademark protection to another
manufacturer's faucet design and faucet handle. 117 The PTO granted
the protection after the manufacturer introduced substantial evidence
that consumers recognized the source of the faucets by their distinctive
111. W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 346.
112. Id. at 337.
113. 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
114. Id. at 633. Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines trademark to include "any word,
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or
merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by
others." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
115. Kohler, 12 F.3d at 636.
116. Id. at 638.
117. Id. at 633.
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configurations.1 1 8 The manufacturer challenging the PTO's ruling argued that protecting product configurations under the trademark laws
would interfere with the patent laws and would be the equivalent of a
perpetual patent.' 1 9 The Seventh Circuit disagreed:
Compared to patent protection, trademark protection is relatively weak
because it precludes competitors only from using marks that are likely
to confuse or deceive the public. Trademark protection is dependent
only on public reaction to the trademark in the marketplace rather than
solely on the similarity of configurations. An applicant for trademark
protection need prove only that the proposed trademark is distinctive;
that is, that it is either arbitrary, suggestive, or descriptive and has
secondary meaning .... Significantly, while a patent creates a type of
monopoly pricing power by giving the patentee the exclusive right to
make and sell the innovation, a trademark gives the owner only the
right to preclude others from using
the mark when such use is likely to
20
cause confusion or to deceive.'
The court seems to imply that the granting of trade dress protection
to a product configuration, formerly covered by a patent, is not necessarily an extension of the patent monopoly. The court seems not to interpret Lanham Act coverage as sounding in any real monopoly protection,
because a competitor can copy a product as long as the competitor takes
appropriate steps to prevent consumer confusion. Notwithstanding this
apparent view by the Seventh Circuit in this case, the court's dicta in the
following case suggests that the court would rule consistently with Vornado if the same facts were presented.
c.

2
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp. ' 1

In Thomas & Betts, the Seventh Circuit could have confronted the
Vornado decision squarely. However, the court expressly refused to consider the validity of that decision because the plaintiff failed to make out
22
a prima facie case of trade dress infringement.'
This case involved the two largest suppliers of cable ties, which are
small nylon belts used to bundle wires.' 23 Specifically at issue here was
the two-piece tie, which the court described as follows:
In the two-piece tie, the nylon pawl is replaced by a metal barb which is
inserted into the head of the tie and sits in a slot transverse to the slit
for the strap. When the strap is inserted through the slit, the barb
flexes into the transverse slot. When the strap is pulled taut, the tension on the strap causes the flexed barb to bite into the nylon strap and
118. Kohler, 12 F.3d at 633.
119. Id. at 636.

120. Id. at 637 (citations omitted).
121. 65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1044 (1996).
122. Id. at 660.
123. Id. at 655.
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hold tight. Because the metal barb eliminates the need for teeth or
ridges on the strap, the two-piece cable tie has a number
of advantages,
12 4
including infinite adjustability and a stronger strap.
The plaintiff obtained a patent on its two-piece cable tie in 1965 and
the patent expired in 1982.125 The plaintiff claimed the slot, head, and
barb portions of the tie in the patent, and illustrated and described the
oval shape of the head in the specifications. 1 2 6 Shortly after the patent
expired, the plaintiff began marketing a two-piece cable tie under the
12 7
trademark TY-RAP that was essentially identical to the patented tie.
In 1993, the defendant began marketing a two-piece cable tie under the
trademark BARB-TY. 128 The defendant's tie was essentially identical to
the plaintiffs tie. 129 The plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from
further marketing of the product, alleging that the BARB-TY product
infringed upon the plaintiffs trade dress because of the oval-shaped
13
head. o
The court ruled that the plaintiff failed to prove that the oval-shaped
configuration of its TY-RAP product had acquired secondary meaning,
which the Seventh Circuit requires prima facie in trade dress infringement actions.' 3 ' The court acknowledged the Vornado decision and appears to have supported some of the analysis from that case:
The present case is distinguishable from Vornado but it is not clear that
the differences dictate a different result. The oval shape of the cable tie
head was not specifically claimed in the [plaintiffs] patent.., while the
spiral grill was a required element in at least one of the claims in the
patent at issue in Vornado. Therefore, one could infringe [plaintiffs]
patent without infringing its trade dress while any product which infringed the Vornado patent (at least the claim in which the spiral
grill
13 2
was an element) would also infringe its claimed trade dress.
Again, the court stopped short of embracing Vornado in toto because
the plaintiff "failed to clear the initial hurdle" of establishing its ovalshaped head as protectable trade dress. 13s However, the court's assessment of the facts against the backdrop of Vornado implies support of the
Tenth Circuit's reasoning.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 656.
Id.
Thomas & Betts, 65 F.3d at 656.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Thomas & Betts, 65 F.3d at 660.

132. Id. at 659-60 (case name not emphasized in original).
133. Id. at 660.
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d. Zip Dee, Inc, v. Domestic Corp.13 4
In Zip Dee, the Northern District of Illinois, ruling without any clear
direction from the Seventh Circuit, advocated a case-by-case approach to
resolving the patent law vs. trademark law conflict. The court defined
the precise issue in that case as "whether a product configuration that
played some role-dependent claim, preferred embodiment or one embodiment-in a patented invention itself can be the subject of a product
13 5
configuration trademark."
The plaintiff held a patent issued in 1967, for the production of awnings for recreational vehicles using a series of metal slats. 13 6 The
plaintiff "bright dipped" the slatted metal covers, which gave the awnings a bright and shiny finish akin to a mirror. 13 7 Subsequent to the
expiration of the patent in 1984, a company later acquired by the defendant company began producing metal awnings with slatted metal covers
and a mirror-like appearance. 138 The plaintiff sued for trade dress infringement and obtained an injunction against the defendant from fur13 9
ther trade dress infringement.
After acquiring the enjoined company in 1988, the defendant began
producing awnings which resembled the plaintiffs awnings, but without
the "mirror-like bright shiny finish." 140 The plaintiff attempted to have
the defendant held in contempt for violating the injunction; however, the
court ruled that the defendant's design did not violate the injunction. 14 '
Subsequently, the plaintiff successfully obtained a trademark on the
"overall configuration of a slatted cover for an awning on a recreational
vehicle," and later sought to enjoin the defendant from "continuing to
1 42
make similar [recreational vehicle] awnings."
The Northern District of Illinois agreed in principle with the defendant's Vornado-type argument that granting trademark protection for a
product configuration claimed in an expired utility patent could contravene federal patent policy. 1 43 However, the court recast the Vornado issue in what it called "more familiar terms" as "whether the granting of a
trademark (and thus an indefinite monopoly) on a product configuration
134. 52 PTCJ 426 (N.D. Il. 1996).

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Zip Dee, 52 PTCJ at 426.
140. Id. According to the defendant's interpretation, the injunction banned only the
production of awnings with a shiny finish. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. The plaintiff also sought to recover damages for "past violations of [its] patent
rights." Zip Dee, 52 PTCJ at 426.
143. Id.
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claimed or otherwise disclosed as part of a patented invention would pre1
vent the invention itself from being copied and used by the public." '
The court concluded that the plaintiffs claims in the expired patent for
the production of recreational vehicle awnings were broad enough to permit the invention to be practiced by the public, despite the plaintiffs
145
trademark rights on the configuration.
The court's test in Zip Dee amounts to a case-by-case approach to the
problem of Lanham Act protection for product configurations which are
or have been significant inventive components of inventions covered by
utility patents. However, such an approach has institutional shortcomings and is unlikely to be embraced by the Supreme Court. Whether this
case-by-case approach is the general view of the Seventh Circuit is difficult to say, as the cases cited herein do not appear to have a consistent
theme.
3. Ninth Circuit
46
Clamp ManufacturingCo. v. Enco ManufacturingCo.1

a.

In Clamp Manufacturing,the issue was whether a "C" clamp config14 7
uration was functional, hence ineligible for trademark protection.
Here, a clamp manufacturer which manufactured and distributed "C"
clamps brought a trademark infringement action against a competitor.148 The "C" clamp was formerly the subject of a utility patent which
expired in 1972. Nearly five years after expiration of the patent, the defendant company began purchasing and distributing a line of "C" clamps
which very closely resembled the plaintiffs "C" clamps, but were manufactured in Korea. 14 9 The district court found that the plaintiff had fulfilled the necessary prerequisites to a valid trademark action in the
Ninth Circuit, specifically that the design was "distinctive, primarily
nonfunctional, and arbitrary, and that commercially feasible alternative
configurations exist[ed]." 5 0° The Ninth Circuit considered the design "a
close call," and refrained from reversing the decision based on the clearly
144. Id. The Zip Dee court summarized the modified terms as follows:
[Tihe policies underlying patent law dictate the denial of trademark protection to
a product configuration that has been claimed as part of a utility patent in either
of two circumstances: (1) if the product configuration is functional within the context of the utility patent in which the product configuration is claimed; or (2) if the
product configuration is functional in the more general sense that competitors in
the market generally need the configuration in order to compete.

Id.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
870 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 513.
Id. at 513.
Id.

150. Id. at 516.
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erroneous standard. 1 1 In discussing the factors to be considered in determining whether a product configuration is functional, the court
touched on the role that evidence of an expired utility patent on the configuration would play:
If the utilitarian aspects of the product are its essence, only patent law
protects its configuration from use by competitors ....

To assist in ana-

lyzing functionality, several factors may be examined: the existence of
an expired utility patent disclosing the utilitarianadvantage of the design sought to be protected as a trademark; the extent of advertising

touting the utilitarian advantages of the design; the availability of alternative designs; and whether a particular design results
from a com15 2
paratively simple or cheap method of manufacture.
On the one hand, one may argue that the Ninth Circuit's identification of the prior existence of a utility patent which discloses the usefulness of a design for which a party seeks trademark protection, as
evidence of functionality, implies that the court would endorse a Vornado-type analysis. According to this argument, the court's recognition
of this utility patent disclosure as evidence of functionality, indicates
that the court can appreciate, on a basic level, the necessity to refuse
trademark protection for a design which was formerly patented. On the
other hand, the stronger argument is that the Ninth Circuit's use of the
prior existence of a utility patent on a design, merely as one piece of evidence, necessarily reveals its rejection of the Vornado bright-line rule.
The court's listing of several elements, in essence, implies a balancing
test. 15 3 In contrast, the Vornado rule would absolutely preclude Lanham Act protection for a product configuration covered by a utility patent, if the configuration was a significant inventive component of the
covered invention.'5 Another argument against the view that this case
implies Ninth Circuit agreement with Vornado is that the court's reference to the utility patent disclosure is just another way of expressing
what Vornado emphatically rejected: that the functionality doctrine
eliminates overlap between patent and trademark law.'55 Hence, the
Ninth Circuit does not appear to have made any significant pronouncements relating to the Vornado principle.
B.

HISTORY OF RELATED SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Starting with a case exactly 100 years ago, the Supreme Court has
on several occasions discussed principles relevant to the issue at hand.
The Court's perspective in these cases serves as the basis for this arti151. Clamp Manufacturing, 870 F.2d at 517.

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 516 (emphasis added).
Id. at 514.
Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1510.
Id. at 1508.
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cle's conclusion that the Supreme Court likely will agree with the result
and reasoning of the Tenth Circuit's Vornado decision, when the Court
decides to hear a case with similar facts.
1.

56
Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co.1

Singer presented the Supreme Court with a chance to weigh the
rights of a formerly patented product manufacturer against the rights of
a competitor to use the general appearance of that product after the patent on the product expired. However, the Court gave most of its attention to the issue of whether the name "Singer" had become so associated
with the genus of sewing machines produced by the plaintiff, that the
name had become generic and, thus, unavailable for trademark
15 7
protection.
For several years, the plaintiff successfully manufactured and sold
sewing machines under the name "Singer."158 The machines had a distinct look and had received several utility patents.1 5 9 The plaintiff
brought a common law unfair competition action against a competitor for
manufacturing and selling sewing machines of the exact same size,
shape, ornamentation, and general external appearance as the plaintiffs. 160 In addition, the plaintiff accused the defendant of attempting to
deceive the public with the use of the name "Singer" on the defendant's
product, which the plaintiff claimed as a registered trademark. 16 1 The
defendant argued that the form, size, shape, and appearance of the sewing machines had entered the public domain after the expiration of the
patents. The defendant further contended that the name "Singer" was
62
the generic name for the types of machines sold by both parties.'
The Court agreed with the defendant that the name "Singer" evolved
into the generic name of the genus of sewing machines and, thus, was
public property which could not be appropriated by any one manufacturer through a trademark. 1 6 3 In regard to the configuration of the sewing machines, the Court stated:
It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created
by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by
the patent becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the
patent is granted. It follows, as a matter of course, that on the termination of the patent there passes to the public the right to make the
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

163 U.S. 169 (1896).
Singer, 163 U.S. at 203.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 169.

161. Id.
162. Singer, 163 U.S. at 169.
163. Id. at 203.
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machine in the form in which it was constructed during the patent. We
may therefore dismiss without further comment the
complaint as to the
16 4

form in which the defendant made his machines.

Although the modern concept of trade dress had not been coined during the Singer period, the Court was concerned with the same principle.
Therefore, this case appears to be a century-old Supreme Court precedent for the principle that a product configuration which was the subject
of an expired patent cannot be further monopolized by the former patent
holder under any legal principle.
There may be a cognizable argument that because the modern concept of trade dress was not recognized during the time of this case, the
case is not reliable authority for the primary issue involved in this article. The basis for this argument would be that as federal law began to
recognize an enforceable right of merchants to exclude others from using
a certain product look, the Supreme Court's apparent "slam dunk" analysis in Singer was weakened. This argument may be legitimate on a basic
level. Yet when we consider the fact that trade dress protection under
the Lanham Act only creates a federal cause of action for a state common
law unfair competition action, the argument loses some vigor. 165 This is
because the plaintiffs claim against the defendant in Singer was based
on common law unfair competition. 166
2.

67
Kellogg Co. v. NationalBiscuit Co. 1

In Kellogg, the Supreme Court again heard arguments in a state unfair competition action which acquired federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.1 6 8 The issue was whether a product name which
had become generic over time, and a product shape which was formerly
covered by a design patent, were protectable trade indicia of a particular
manufacturer. 16 9 The plaintiff here was a manufacturer of shredded
wheat. 170 The plaintiff claimed exclusive rights to use the trade name
"Shredded Wheat" and to make the product in a pillow-shape. 1 7 1 The
plaintiff argued
that the defendant, by using the name and shape, was
"passing off"1 7 2 its product for that of the plaintiff. 17 3 The defendant ar164. Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
165. See Truck Equip. Servs. Co, v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
166. Singer, 163 U.S. at 184.
167. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
168. Id. at 113.
169. Id. at 116.
170. Id. at 111.
171. Id.

172. "Passing off' is the term used in unfair competition actions to describe the prohibited act of deliberately deceiving consumers as to the origin of a particular product.
173. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 111.
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gued that the plaintiff did not have an exclusive right to use the name or
the shape of the product, and also contended that it took all reasonable
measures to distinguish its product from that of the plaintiff.174 The
lower courts found that the term "Shredded Wheat" was the generic
name for the product, and that the design patent on the product covered
175
its pillow-shaped form.
In response to the plaintiffs claim to the exclusive use of the pillowshaped form of the product, the Supreme Court held:
The plaintiff has not the exclusive right to sell shredded wheat in the
form of a pillow-shaped biscuit-the form in which the article became
known to the public. That is the form in which shredded wheat was
made under the basic patent. The patented machines used were
designed to produce only the pillow-shaped biscuits. And a design patent was taken out to cover the pillow-shaped form. Hence, upon expiration of the patents the form, as well as the name, was dedicated to the
public .... Moreover, the pillow-shape must be used [by the plaintiffs
competitors] for another reason. The evidence is persuasive that this
form is functional-that the cost of the biscuit would be increased and
its high quality lessened if some other form were substituted for the
pillow-shape.176
The Court's holding again imparts the principle that where a product's form (configuration) has been covered by a patent, upon the patent's
expiration the form becomes a part of the public domain. There may be
an argument that two aspects of this case sufficiently distinguish it from
Vornado so as to make this case unreliable as standing for that principle:
first, the product shape was covered by a design patent, whereas the
product configuration in Vornado was covered by a utility patent; and
second, the Court found the shape to be functional, in contrast to the
Vornado court's finding.
Regarding the first distinction, the fact that the product shape was
formerly covered by a design patent rather than a utility patent is an
irrelevant distinction in light of the Vornado ruling. Regardless of the
type of patent, the subject matter formerly covered should become unrestricted public property upon the patent's expiration, according to the
Tenth Circuit in Vornado and the Supreme Court in Kellogg. The second
distinction is also inconsequential in the context of Vornado, since the
Tenth Circuit's holding did not turn on whether the product configuration was functional. In fact, the court dismissed the functionality analysis altogether. 17 7 These different factual differences, therefore, do not
lessen Kellogg's authoritative force for the proposition in Vornado.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 117-18.
Id. at 119-20, 122.
Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1499.
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1 78
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.

In Sears, the Supreme Court made clear to the states that federal
patent policy preempted state unfair competition rights regarding product design. The Court, speaking through Justice Black, defined the issue
as "whether a State's unfair competition law can, consistently with the
federal patent laws, impose liability for or prohibit the copying of an arti79
cle which is protected by neither a federal patent nor a copyright."'
This case involved the manufacture and sale of pole lamps. The
Court described the pole lamps as vertical tubes with lamp fixtures along
the outside. The tubes were built in such a way that they stood upright
between the floor and ceiling of a room.i 8 0 The plaintiff acquired both
design and utility patents on the poles.' 8 1 The lamps were a great success for the plaintiff. Shortly after the plaintiff began marketing them,
the defendant introduced an almost identical lamp.' 8 2 However, the de83
fendant sold his lamps for a cheaper price than the plaintiff.'

The plaintiff brought suit in federal district court, claiming both federal patent infringement and unfair competition pursuant to Illinois
law.' 8 4 The district court first held that the plaintiffs patents were invalid for lack of invention.' 8 5 Yet the court also held that the defendant
had unfairly competed by selling "a substantially exact copy" of the
plaintiffs lamp, in violation of Illinois law.' 8 6 The district court thus
sales of the lamps, and the Seventh
enjoined the defendant from further
87
Circuit affirmed the injunction.1
Justice Black's holding in this case is one of the most oft-quoted
Supreme Court holdings concerning intellectual property rights. He
wrote:
An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired,
is in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses
to do so. What [Defendant] did was to copy [Plaintiffs] design and to
sell lamps almost identical to those sold by [Plaintiff]. This it had every
right to do under the federal patent laws .... To allow a State by use of
its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article which
represents too slight an advance to be patented would be to permit the
State to block off from the public something which federal law has said
belongs to the public ....
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

376 U.S. 225 (1964).
Id. at 225.
Id. at 226.
Id.
Id.

183. Sears, 376 U.S. at 226.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that
goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as to the
source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their trademarks,
labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent
others, by imitating such markings, from misleading purchasers as to
the source of the goods. But because of the federal patent laws a State
may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit
the copying of the article itself or award damages for such copying.- 88
Although this case involved patent law vs. state unfair competition
law, the Court's holding is very relevant to the federal trade dress vs.
federal patent law conflict. This is because the premier principle that
undergirds this holding is that patent laws, founded on federal constitutional precepts which grant monopoly rights for a limited period, may
not be undermined by other legal principles which grant monopolies
based on less stringent requirements.' 8 9 This principle transcends any
distinction between state and federal law, or statutory and common
law. 190
One may argue that Sears does not stand for this principle because
the Court's holding was based on federal supremacy versus state law,
rather than patent supremacy versus any other laws. This argument
may appear colorable at first blush, but loses much of its luster in light of
the Court's many references to patent policy throughout the case. 19 In
comparison, the Court only makes two fleeting references to the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 192

188. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32.
189. Id. at 230.
190. See also Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) (holding, in a case very similar to Sears, that a state may not use unfair competition laws to
protect an unpatented or uncopyrighted product, even if the sale of the exact copy of an
article by a competitor was likely to confuse consumers; such protection would impermissibly clash with federal patent laws).
191. See, e.g., id. at 229, where the Court stated:
Patents are not given as favors ... but are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by the patent,
to exclude others from the use of his invention. During that period of time no one
may make, use, or sell the patented product without the patentee's authority. But
in rewarding useful invention, the 'rights and welfare of the community must be
fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.' To that end the prerequisites to obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when the patent has issued the limitations on its exercise are equally strictly enforced ....
Id. (citations omitted).
192. Id. at 229, 231.
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4. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 193
The Supreme Court announced the same general tenet from Sears,
supra, in Bonito Boats. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor defined
the issue as "what limits the operation of the federal patent system
places on the States' ability to offer substantial protection to utilitarian
1 94
and design ideas which the patent laws leave otherwise unprotected."
In contrast to Sears, this case involved a clash between a state statute and federal patent law. Here, the plaintiff, a Florida corporation, developed a hull design for a fiberglass recreational boat, which required
substantial effort on the plaintiffs part.' 95 The plaintiff employed a process in which it prepared a set of engineering drawings, created a hardwood model from the drawings, and sprayed the model with fiberglass to
create a mold which produced the finished fiberglass boats for sale.' 9 6 In
1976, the plaintiff began marketing the product, which appealed to consumers inside and outside the state.' 97 No evidence existed that the
plaintiff ever attempted to patent the process.198 In 1983, the Florida
Legislature enacted a statute which prevented anyone else from using
the direct molding process to produce a similar boat. 199
The plaintiff brought suit in a Florida state court against the defend20 0
ant, a Tennessee corporation, for an alleged violation of the statute.
The Florida Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs action on grounds
20
that the statute impermissibly interfered with federal patent laws. '
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the state's highest
court. 20 2 Justice O'Connor wrote:
[O]ur past decisions have made clear that state regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance
struck by Congress in our patent laws. The tension between the desire
to freely exploit the full potential of our inventive resources and the
need to create an incentive to deploy these resources is constant. Where
193. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
194. Id. at 143.

195. Id. at 144.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 144.
199. Id. at 144-45. The Florida statute, in pertinent part, made "[i]t... unlawful for
any person to use the direct molding process to duplicate for the purpose of sale any manufactured vessel hull or component part of a vessel made by another without the written
permission of that other person" and further made it unlawful to "knowingly sell a vessel
hull or component part of a vessel duplicated in violation" of the above provision (citing
FLA. STAT. § 559.94 (1987)).

200. Id. at 145.
201. Id.
202. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 166.
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it is clear how the patent laws strike that balance in a particular circumstance, that is not a judgment the States may second-guess ....
A state law that substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or design conception which has been freely disclosed by its author to the public at large impermissibly contravenes the
ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which is the centerpiece of
federal patent policy. Moreover, through the creation of patent-like
rights, the States could essentially redirect inventive efforts away from
the careful criteria of patentability developed by Congress over the last
2 03
200 years.
Despite this apparently clear mandate by the Court that state laws
which seek to regulate the intellectual property arena will be invalidated
to the extent that they contravene federal patent principals, a valid argument may exist that other language from this case muddies the water
a little. A brief consideration of this language indicates that this argument cannot be off-handedly dismissed. The Court stated:
[Olur decision in Sears clearly indicates that the States may place limited regulations on the circumstances in which ... [trade dress] designs
are used in order to prevent consumer confusion as to source. Thus,
while Sears speaks in absolutist terms, its conclusion that the States
may place some conditions on the use of trade dress indicates an implicit
recognition that all state regulation of potentially patentable but unpatented subject
matter is not ipso facto preempted by the federal patent
20 4
laws.
Thus, a valid argument may exist that this language reveals the
Court's willingness to permit trade dress law, whether state or federal,
to impose on patent principles under certain circumstances. This argument would conclude that the Vornado absolutist rule goes too far in preserving patent goals. But this would seem a strong conclusion to draw
from the clear dicta in Sears and Bonito Boats.
5.

20 5

Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.

In Two Pesos, the Supreme Court provided tremendous impetus to
federal trade dress plaintiffs. The Court held that § 43(a) could provide
protection for a merchant's trade dress without a showing of secondary
meaning. 20 6 According to the Court, all that should be required for trade
20 7
dress protection is that the dress be inherently distinctive.
The plaintiff in this case was an operator of a chain of Mexican fastfood restaurants in the state of Texas. 20 8 The defendant operated a res203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 152, 156-57.
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154 (emphasis added).
112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
Id. at 2757.
Id. at 2761.
Id. at 2755.
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taurant in the same area.20 9 The plaintiff opened several restaurants in
the San Antonio area between 1978 and 1985. These restaurants had a
certain Mexican motif which the plaintiff claimed as its trade dress. 210
At the end of 1985, the defendant opened a restaurant in Houston which
had a Mexican motif strikingly similar to the plaintiff s. 2 1 1 A year later,
the plaintiffs chain expanded to the Houston area, and after being there
for a year, filed a trade dress action against the defendant in federal dis12
trict court.

2

The district court and the Fifth Circuit held that § 43(a) only required the plaintiff to prove that its trade dress was inherently distinctive or had acquired secondary meaning. 2 13 Writing for the Court,
Justice White acknowledged that the lower courts' holdings sharply conflicted with the standard in other federal circuits, which generally hold
that trade dress can be protected only on a showing of secondary mean2 15
ing. 2 14 But the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's reading of § 43(a).
Justice White reasoned that as other sections of the Lanham Act protected inherently distinctive trademarks, such as suggestive, arbitrary,
and fanciful marks, without a showing of secondary meaning, there was
no principled basis on which § 43(a) could be read any differently. 21 6
Justice White added:
Engrafting onto § 43(a) a requirement of secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade dress also would undermine the purposes of the
Lanham Act. Protection of trade dress, no less than trademarks, serves
the Act's purpose to 'secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his
business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among
competing producers.' National protection of trademarks is desirable,
Congress concluded, because trademarks foster competition and the
maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good
reputation. (citations omitted). By making more difficult the identification of a producer with its product, a secondary meaning requirement
for a nondescriptive trade dress would
hinder improving or maintaining
2 17
the producer's competitive position.
An argument may be made that the Court's holding espouses a willingness to recognize broad protection for trade dress under § 43(a). However, this case in no way involved patent rights or principles, nor product
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2755.
Id. at 2753.
Id. at 2756.

Id.
Id.
Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2761.
Id. at 2760.

217. Id.at 2760 (citing to a Senate Report) (citations omitted).
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configurations. Therefore, this case should not be interpreted as showing
an inclination by the Court to reject the Vornado principle.
6.

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc.218

In Qualitex, the Supreme Court added another feather in the hat of
Lanham Act protection. Defining the issue as "whether the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946... permits the registration of a trademark that
consists, purely and simply, of a color," the Court held that "sometimes, a
color will meet ordinary legal trademark requirements... [a]nd, when it
does so, no special legal rule prevents color alone from serving as a
21 9
trademark."
In this case, the parties were competitors in the manufacturing and
selling of pads, to dry cleaning firms, for use in the dry cleaning process. 22 0 The plaintiff used a special shade of green-gold color on its pads
for 40 years. 2 2 1 In 1989, the defendant began to sell similar green-gold
colored press pads to dry cleaning firms. 22 2 Two years later, the plaintiff
received trademark protection for the special green-gold color on the
press pads and filed a trademark infringement suit against the
defendant.223
The Supreme Court heard the case on appeal from the Ninth Circuit
after that court refused to recognize the plaintiffs trademark for a
color. 22 4 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, recognizing
the ability of a color to serve as a trademark. 2 25 Justice Breyer wrote for
the Court:
Both the language of the [Lanham] Act and the basic underlying principles of trademark law would seem to include color within the universe
of things that can qualify as a trademark. The language of the Lanham
Act describes that universe in the broadest of terms. It says that trademarks 'includ[e] any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof.' Since human beings might use as a 'symbol' or 'device' almost
anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read
literally, is not restrictive. If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance can act
226
as symbols why, one might ask, can a color not do the same?
2 2 7
Similar to Two PeSOS,
this case may be interpreted as the Court
218. 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
219. Id. at 1302.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302. The plaintiff actually added the trademark infringement claim to an unfair competition suit previously filed. Id.
224. Id.
225. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
226. Id. at 1302-03 (citations omitted).
227. 112 S. Ct. 2753.
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conveying a willingness to recognize broad coverage for the Lanham Act.
Again, however, this case in no way involved patent principles or product
configurations. Therefore, no sound basis exists for an argument that
this case is evidence that the Court would disagree with the Tenth Circuit in Vornado.
C.

THE

SUPREME CouwR's DECISION ON

A VORnvADo-TYPE

APPEAL

The Supreme Court's rulings in the previously discussed cases appear to reveal that the Court would adopt both the reasoning and the
bright-line rule of the Vornado court. The Supreme Court likely will
hold that a product configuration, which is or has been a significant inventive component of an invention covered by a utility patent, may not
receive trade dress protection, because such protection would contravene
federal patent policy. In arriving at such a holding, the Court will likely
give considerable attention to three major concerns: first, that state unfair competition law is analogous to federal law under § 43(a), because
the courts have interpreted § 43(a) so broadly as to create a federal law
of unfair competition; 2 28 second, that the functionality doctrine does not
always eliminate overlap between the Lanham Act and the Patent Act,
hence a bright-line rule in this area may be appropriate; and third, that
the Court's most recent cases in this area, Two Pesos and Qualitex, are
not necessarily inconsistent with prior precedents discussing this overall
22 9
theme.
1.

State Unfair Competition Law and Section 43(a)

The Supreme Court in Singer, Kellogg, Sears, and Compco, discussed the limits on state unfair competition law when that law crossed
the path of federal patent law concerning the copying of product shapes.
In each one of those cases, the Court ruled that unfair competition law
must yield to patent law in the area of restricting the copying of product
designs, where these designs were either formerly covered by patents or
were denied patents for some reason. 230 Because state unfair competi228. See J. THoMAS MCCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNPAIm COMPETION
§§ 1.09[31, 27.03[1][b] (3d ed. 1994) (stating that courts have engaged in judicial legislation
to engraft many principles on § 43(a) which do not exist in the language of the statute, thus
creating a federal law of unfair competition).
229. See generally Singer, 163 U.S. 169 (1896); Kellogg, 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Sears, 376
U.S. 225 (1964); Compco, 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (recognizing the supremacy of patent policy over unfair competition and other trademark-related
principles).
230. See Singer, 163 U.S. at 185; Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 119-22; Sears, 376 U.S. at 232-33;
Compco, 376 U.S. at 238 (discussing whether unfair competition law must yield to patent
law in the copying of product designs where the designs have been formerly covered by
patents or previously denied patents).
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tion protection is analogous to § 43(a) federal protection, the Court's
principles in those cases apply equally to conflicts between § 43(a) and
patent law.
The tie binding all of the unfair competition cases is the principle
that patent policy requires that product shapes which enjoyed the benefit
of the patent monopoly not enjoy an extended monopoly through some
non-patent source. Logically, the Lanham Act is also a prohibited nonpatent source. This principle amounts to no more than a basic contractual axiom: the government (hence, the public), through the patent laws,
grants a monopoly to an inventor for considerationthat after the limited
monopoly period, the public gains the full benefit of the inventor's ingenuity and creativity; to permit some non-patent legal source to extend
the inventor's monopoly period would in effect dissolve the public's consideration and thus invalidate the entire contract. The inviolability of
this contract is even more salient in light of its federal constitutional
foundation. The Tenth Circuit followed these principles in Vornado.
The Bonito Boats case did not involve a state unfair competition dispute, but instead a state statute which sought to restrict use of a manufacturing process. 2 3 1 The Supreme Court, however, generally applied
2 32
the same principle just mentioned in striking down that state statute.
The precise principle there was that an inventor who fails to exploit the
patent laws to restrict copying of his industrial process cannot use some
other law, which would grant him a longer monopoly, without subjecting
him to the rigors required for patent law approval. 23 3 Because monopolies tend to be disfavored in free-enterprise society, when they are permitted, a great need arises for federal law to regulate and control them
so that society is not harmed. Permitting a state statute to serve as an
alternative means of gaining a monopoly would blatantly undermine this
federal public policy objective.
This tenet also applies where the inventor seeks to extend his monopoly through a federal statute other than the patent laws. Granted,
there is a difference. The inventor would be utilizing federal law which,
as was previously stated, should be the source of granting and regulating
the monopoly protection. But Congress did not balance the competing
interests regarding monopolies in enacting the Lanham Act as it did in
the Patent Act.2 3 4 Furthermore, while the Lanham Act is concerned
with protecting consumers from confusion as to product source, as well
as protecting producers in their goodwill generated by marketing quality
goods, that statute historically falls short as it relates to product shapes.
231. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141.

232. Id. at 154.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 152.
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As the Tenth Circuit noted in Vornado, product shapes for several years
were not even protected by the Lanham Act. Moreover, courts have consistently ignored the necessity of protecting consumers from confusion or
protecting producers' goodwill when it comes to functional configurations. Functional configurations may be copied ad nauseam, regardless
of consumer confusion. Therefore, just as the Lanham Act is forced to
yield to the public's right to copy functional configurations, which shows
that the Act's goals are not inviolable, the Act should be curtailed where
its application would do violence to the Patent Act goals. This balances
competing interests involving monopoly protection. In other words, the
Lanham Act should not be allowed to wreak havoc in an area with which
the Act is not even fundamentally concerned-that being, the requirements for monopoly protection of product configurations. Again,
Supreme Court precedent is consistent with these principles.
2.

The FunctionalityDoctrine'sShortcomings in Solving the Problem

The Vornado court discussed the fact that several courts assumed
that the functionality doctrine will automatically eliminate overlap between federal trademark law and federal patent law concerning utility
patents. The Tenth Circuit explained why this assumption is inaccurate.
The problem is that federal courts generally consider a product configuration functional only if competitors need to be able to use the configuration to make an equally competitive product. Consequently, as long as
alternative configurations allow competitors to compete with the supplier seeking Lanham Act protection, the configuration sought to be protected is considered nonfunctional. The configuration consequently is
eligible for trade dress protection. But the fact that there may be alternative satisfactory configurations does not render the configuration nonuseful in patent law terms. In fact, patent law's usefulness requirement
is not at all concerned with competitive need. Therefore, as was the case
in Vornado, a product configuration can be simultaneously useful under
patent law and nonfunctional under trade dress law.
The result is that an inventor who includes a product configuration-which may or may not be claimed in the patent application despite
adding to the invention's ability to secure a patent-would receive a
windfall. The inventor receives his windfall by securing monopoly patent protection for the invention, including the configuration, and then
when the patent expires, he acquires trade dress protection for the configuration. Such a result would not only undermine patent law goals, but
would also cheat the public out of a bargained-forexchange in the patent
contract. The Supreme Court recognized the need to prevent such an
anomalous result, as is clearly reflected by the Court's precedents.
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The Supreme Court may decide to empower the various federal district courts to resolve subsequent Vornado-type conflicts, by advocating a
case-by-case approach for resolving trademark and patent disputes.
Such an approach would allow district court judges to determine
whether a formerly patented invention could be fully practiced by the
public, notwithstanding the existence of a trademark or trade dress covering a claimed or significant aspect of the invention. However, this approach would appear to be rife with institutional problems that present
grave risks to the integrity of our patent system. This approach would
require federal district judges and juries, who generally lack any technical training or orientation, to decide cases involving tremendously sophisticated technology. Again, the hallmark of our patent system is the
notion that inventors may enjoy short-term monopoly protection in exchange for the public's eventual unrestricted right to practice the invention. A case-by-case approach would subject the entire legitimacy of our
patent system to the non-technical predilections of district judges and
their law clerks, not to mention the pure novices in the jury box. The
only way to avoid this risk is for the Supreme Court to pronounce a
bright-line rule such as the Vornado principle. The Court clearly places
a premium on the supremacy of patent policy; accordingly, this community awaits the Courts next bright-line decision in this area.
3.

Two Pesos and Qualitex do not PresentProblems

The Supreme Court's holdings in Two Pesos and Qualitex may justify a belief that the Court is on a path of expanding Lanham Act protection. But those cases did not even remotely concern the important
patent principles discussed in Singer, Kellogg, Sears, Compco, or Bonito
Boats. Moreover, neither Two Pesos nor Qualitex discussed product
shapes or configurations. Therefore, even if Two Pesos and Qualitex signaled the Court's embarkment upon a path of expansive Lanham Act
protection, this writer believes that path is crawling with land mines labeled "Vornado!" Notwithstanding the Court's recognition in those two
cases of the importance of the Lanham Act in protecting producers and
consumers, the Court would likely limit that recognition to protect the
supremacy of patent laws over product configurations.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that the Supreme Court never squarely addressed
the issue involved in Vornado, the Court's precedents strongly reflect
principles announced by the Tenth Circuit in that case. The Court has
consistently held that product shapes which are the subject matter of
expired patents shall not receive continued protection under non-patent
laws. The Court reasoned that such continued protection runs afoul of
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patent law's policy objectives, which include making certain that ideas
which are in the public domain remain there. The Court also stated that
patent law plays a very important role in the industrial development of
this country. This is accompanied by balancing the competing interests
of free use of inventive resources against the need for continued invention incentives.
The cases cited from the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits appear
in varying degrees to emphasize the importance of the core patent principles discussed throughout this paper. These circuits, however, clearly
are in disagreement on this issue. Further, a persuasive argument could
be made that the precedents within these circuits seem rather chaotic.
Accordingly, the Court is likely to at least attempt to settle this confusion
some time in the near future. Again, Supreme Court precedents strongly
suggest adoption of the bright-line rule elaborated by the Tenth Circuit
in Vornado. This would preclude all federal trade dress protection for
any product configurations which are or have been significant inventive
components of inventions covered by utility patents.

